Venture Capital Fund Performance and the IPO Market by McKenzie, Michael & Janeway, William
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Venture Capital Fund Performance and the IPO Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, the investment performance of a large database of venture funds is 
considered over a 28 year period.  The results suggest that a portfolio of venture 
capital partnerships can provide an average return that is superior to the public equity 
market, although the individual fund returns are highly positively skewed.  Absent 
these outliers, the level of fund performance is more inline with public equity market 
returns.  This paper also establishes a link between public equity market conditions 
and venture capital returns.  Finally, some preliminary evidence is provided of venture 
fund performance during and immediately following the dot.com bubble.       
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Introduction 
 
The U.S. National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) was founded in 1974 by 78 
firms with aggregate capital of barely half a billion US dollars.1  Since that time, the 
industry has experienced remarkable growth and by December, 2006, there were 798 
venture capital firms managing a total of $236 billion2 making it one of the key asset 
categories in the alternative investments industry.  Despite its importance however, 
relatively little is known about the experience of those who invest in venture capital 
funds.  This is an important issue as the liquidity risk of venture funds is significantly 
greater than for any other class of asset insomuch as most venture funds have a 
contractual lifespan of ten years and there is a very limited secondary market to 
facilitate an early exit.   
 
The most significant impediment to any research on the venture capital industry is a 
lack of suitable data, as partners are typically not subject to public disclosure 
requirements (see Denis, 2004, p. 320, for a discussion).3  Despite this obstacle, a 
small literature has emerged that has attempted to provide insights into the venture 
industry, including characterising fund performance (see Phalippou, 2007, for a 
survey).  For example, Cochrane, 2000, Quigley and Woodward, 2003 and Hwang, 
Quigley and Woodward, 2005, infer aggregate information about the performance of 
private equity investing using data on the returns to individual venture capital 
projects.  Peng, 2001, Chen, Baeirl and Kaplan, 2002, Woodward and Hall, 2004, and 
Hwang, Quigley and Woodward, 2005 use a repeat valuation model to construct an 
index of venture capital from which overall industry performance may be inferred.  A 
problem with these studies is that they do not take into account the timing of the cash 
flows or the risk profile of the investing companies.  Gompers and Lerner (1997), 
Schmidt (2003) and, in particular, Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) and Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) attempt to overcome these problems by undertaking a more detailed 
level of analysis in which the individual investments of a fund are considered (see 
Section I for a detailed survey of the literature).   
                                               
1
 American Research and Development Corp. is generally regarded as the first venture capital firm.  It 
was launched in 1946 with the aim of commercialising technology developed during the war.   
2
  Source: US National Venture Capital Association, 2006 Yearbook.  
3
 Recently some fund-level data has been revealed by public sector pension funds subject to state-level 
“Sunshine Law” or “Freedom of Information Act” requirements. 
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The purpose of this paper is to characterise and explore the sources of investment 
performance in the venture industry.  To this end, we draw on a unique proprietary 
database of the venture capital investments made by two major limited partners (LPs), 
which is provided on an anonymised basis.  The dataset for one LP begins in 1980, 
while the other begins in 1985.  Since their inception, these LPs have invested in a 
combined total of 387 venture funds, providing a rich database of information for 
analysis.  Dated cash flow information is provided on all takedowns and 
disbursements throughout the life of each fund.  The ability to examine dated 
disbursements to, and realizations from, individual venture funds distinguishes this 
paper from most of the previous literature that has attempted to analyse the returns to 
venture capital.   
 
The sample of fund data is benchmarked using the Venture Expert database, and the 
investment activity of the LPs generally reflects the overall trends in the industry.  
Where the LPs do distinguish themselves however, is in their ability to generate a 
level of return that is superior to both that of the public equity market and the venture 
industry itself.  These returns however, are highly positively skewed such that only a 
small number of extremely high performing funds are responsible for generating the 
excess returns.  In the absence of these outliers, the level of fund performance is far 
less impressive and more inline with public equity market returns.  Thus, although our 
LPs are not representative of the industry as a whole, we consider this to be a virtue of 
our study.  By focusing on two high performing LPs, we are able to explore the source 
of excess returns in the industry.  Further, the results help to explain the high degree 
of variation in venture returns reported in the literature.  To put it simply, our LPs are 
above average performers and this status is a function of their ability to access a small 
number of funds that generate extreme returns.  The majority of LPs however, are not 
be able to invest in these funds, as established general partners (GPs) typically only 
solicit investments from LPs with which they have long standing relationships.  As a 
result, the average industry returns are similar to listed equity and only an elite group 
are able to outperform the public market.4   
 
                                               
4
 Discussions with industry participants provide anecdotal support for this finding.   
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These findings raise a number of interesting questions about the supposed benefits of 
investing in the venture industry.  In terms of the returns to venture investing, the 
majority of investors are unlikely to be able to access the select group of extremely 
high performing funds that are the key to out-performance.  Thus, venture investing 
may not necessarily result in an enhanced expected portfolio return.     
 
A second important contribution of this paper is to establish a link between public 
equity market conditions and venture capital returns.  The early empirical and 
theoretical work on venture capital frequently assumed that the performance of private 
equity was independent of the public equity sector.  A more recent literature has 
emerged that broadly identifies the state of the IPO market as a factor affecting 
venture capital returns.  In this paper, we provide a detailed characterization of the 
evolving state of the venture IPO market through time and link this to venture fund 
performance.  The results of this analysis suggest that the public equity market 
substantially influences venture returns.  Specifically, the median IRR achieved when 
the IPO market is unfavourable at time of exit is 9%, whereas the median IRR for 
funds exiting in a favourable IPO environment was 76%.  The observed correlation of 
venture returns with the public equity market may reduce the diversification benefits 
of a venture capital investment portfolio for institutional investors. 
  
A third contribution of this study is to furnish some preliminary evidence of venture 
fund performance during and immediately following the dot.com bubble.  The 
available data suggests that venture investing during the build up to the peak of the 
bubble was unprecedented in terms of the number of funds, the size of the investments 
made and the extraordinary levels of fund performance.  Further, the number of 
venture-backed IPOs approached an all-time peak during this period.  The most 
distinctive characteristic of the bubble was the unprecedented number of listings of 
unprofitable companies.  The performance of the funds following the bursting of the 
bubble was dramatically lower compared to any time in the preceding 20 year sample 
period.  This reversal coincided with a radical decline in the number of venture-
backed IPOs and the almost complete inability to take unprofitable companies public.     
 
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows.  Section I surveys the relevant 
literature.  Section II characterizes our set of venture funds in some detail. Section III 
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characterises the performance of the sample and compares it to the return on both 
public equity and the venture industry in general.  Section IV considers the issue of 
the persistence in the returns of the funds.  In Section V, the combined database of 
terminated and effectively terminated funds is used to explore the relationship 
between conditions in the public equity market and venture fund performance.  
Section VI considers the impact of the dot.com bubble on the venture industry.  
Finally, Section VII provides some concluding comments. 
 
I.  Literature Survey 
 
The principal source of venture investment data is a commercial database maintained 
by the Venture Economics5 (VE hereafter) unit of Thompson Financial group.  This 
database contains aggregate information on voluntarily reported quarterly fund-level 
cash flows, self-estimated residual values and calculated rates of return, for a large 
number of venture funds.  The VE database is useful when characterising the 
investment behaviour of private equity funds (its intended purpose).  When estimating 
the returns to these funds however, the nature of the data presents a number of 
problems (see Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003).  Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai 
(2007) attempt to overcome this problem by combining the VE database with returns 
data sourced from Private Equity Intelligence as well as other databases that provide 
information on institutional characteristics.  While this does create coverage issues 
(their IRR data is only available for 40% of the funds in the sample and the database 
from which they collect fund information changes is less complete in the early part of 
the sample period) and the data is focused on the lead up to the 2000 bubble period 
(only funds raised between 1991 and 1998 are included), they report a net average 
return to venture investment of 23.7%.  Further, the authors document systematic 
differences in the returns across LPs, which they conclude is a function of different 
investment objectives and levels of sophistication across investors.  
 
As an alternative to using aggregate data to estimate the performance of venture 
funds, a number of different approaches have been taken.  Cochrane (2000), Quigley 
and Woodward (2003) and Hwang, Quigley and Woodward (2005) infer aggregate 
                                               
5
 Formerly known as the Venture eXpert database.  The authors would like to thank Thompson Reuters 
for providing access to this database. 
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information about the performance of private equity investing using data on the 
returns to individual venture capital projects.  Cochrane (2000) argues that this 
approach overcomes the problem of selection bias, which is shown to distort 
estimated venture returns greatly: an uncorrected estimate of 698% is reduced to 59% 
after correction.  Peng (2001) uses the same data as Cochrane (2000) to generate a 
venture capital index based on a repeat sampling method and finds an average 
geometric return of 55%.  Chen, Baeirl and Kaplan (2002), Woodward and Hall 
(2004) and Hwang, Quigley and Woodward (2005) also use a repeat valuation model 
to construct an index of venture capital.  Chen, Baeirl and Kaplan (2002) examined 
completed venture funds and reported a 45% annual average arithmetic return 
(13.38% annual compounded log average return) to their index. 
 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) take a much more direct route and access the underlying 
fund level data which VE use to derive their published aggregate performance data.  
This approach overcomes the problem of aggregation, but not the issues related to 
self-reporting. Their analysis of private equity fund performance over the period 1980 
to 2001 documents a high degree of skew and persistence in venture capital returns.  
They also find that returns on average are not dissimilar to public equity as proxied by 
the S&P500 index.  Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) argue that, as VCs are forced to 
hold undiversified portfolios of illiquid assets, they should be compensated for their 
total risk and not just the idiosyncratic component.  They analyse virtually the same 
database as Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and find that concentrated portfolios have 
higher returns, which is taken as evidence in support of their hypothesis.  Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) also consider firm level VE data and find that better 
networked venture capital firms offer superior performance and greater survival rates.  
On a similar theme, Gomper, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2006) find that venture 
capital partners with more industry-specific experience tend to outperform their peers. 
 
With the exception of Kaplan and Schoar, an important criticism of these studies is 
that they do not take into account the timing of the cash flows (see Ljungqvist and 
Richardson, 2003) or the risk profile of the investing companies.  To overcome these 
problems requires a more detailed level of analysis, in which the individual 
investments of a fund are considered.  Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai (2007, p. 737) 
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argue in favour of using cash flow data to estimate fund returns, even though they 
themselves did not have access to such detailed fund information.  
 
Schmidt (2003) explores a unique dataset of precisely dated cash flows at the 
company level over the period 1970 to 2002.  This data is supplied by the Centre of 
Private Equity Research, which collects detailed private equity data on a completely 
anonymous basis.  The results show that the mean return to private equity only 
outperforms the Russell based US equity benchmark since the late 90’s.  Gompers and 
Lerner (1997) examine the investments of a single venture capital firm (both failures 
as well as successes), and report average annual returns of 30.5% gross of fees over 
the period 1972 – 1997.  Problems related to selection bias (the firm still exists) and 
the authors’ use of marking to market each investment in order to obtain the fund’s 
market value, however, suggest some caution is required when interpreting the results.   
 
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) provide an analysis of private equity returns based 
on actual cash flows using the investment record of a single large institutional 
investor.  This data consists of complete cash flow records for all private equity 
investments made in 73 funds over the period 1981 to 2001.  Ljungqvist and 
Richardson (2003) document an IRR of 19.8% and a positive risk adjusted premium 
of 5–6%, which they attribute to the illiquidity of this type of investment.  One 
limitation of the data used in this study is that the investment objective of their 
institution was not solely limited to maximising returns.  It also had a strategic aspect 
of building relationships with clients who would purchase services from the 
institution.  A further problem is that their “sample represents a reasonable cross 
section of large buyout funds and a much smaller cross-section of venture funds” (p. 
17).  Specifically, only a quarter of the funds in the investment portfolio of the limited 
partner are venture funds.  By way of comparison, 75% of all private equity funds in 
the VE database are venture focussed.  Similarly, 15% of the limited partners capital 
was invested in venture funds, compared to 41.5% for all funds in the VE database.  
Thus, the bias of this sample toward buy-out funds limits the extent to which it is able 
to provide insights into the venture investment experience.   
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II. Venture Capital Fund Characteristics 
 
The dataset in this paper is derived from the records of two large LPs, each of whom 
has been actively investing in venture capital funds for over 20 years.  The investment 
objective of these LPs is limited solely to maximising their risk-adjusted returns, and 
both have a policy of not holding stock distributed from the General Partner (GP).  
This data was provided under the conditions of anonymity, which precludes us from 
revealing their names or details of the funds in which they invested.  The LPs provide 
a complete record of the takedowns and disbursements for every fund on a cash-out 
(to the venture capital firm) and cash/stock-in (to the LP) basis up to the end of June 
30, 2007.6  As a result, these data are not subject to survivorship bias as all 
investments made by the LPs are included.7  The data includes both terminated funds 
and residual value funds (i.e., those funds that have investments that are yet to be fully 
realised) giving a total of 387 funds.8   
 
A summary of the number of funds in the database across each year is presented in 
Table I.  Note that the data from 1980 through 1984 represents the activity of only one 
of the LPs, who invested in an average of six funds each year.  Data on the second 
LPs venture investments begins in 1985.  The first funds in the database have a 
vintage year of 1979 and made their first investment in 1980.  The most recent fund in 
the sample commenced in 2002 and was terminated in early 2006 after only 3.2 years.  
This fund does not mark the end of the sample however, as the last fund to be 
terminated was fully redeemed in June 2007.9   
 
                                               
6
 The information does not include descriptions of the funds, which means that we do not know how 
representative our database is of the universe of venture capital funds in terms of the types of 
investments made (size, specific or general, industry focus) nor whether the fund is a first time or 
subsequent fund raised by the GP.  Where possible, this data will be benchmarked against the wider 
industry to provide some insights as to how representative the sample is.   
7
 Although it could be argued that since both of these LPs still exist, a second order survivorship bias is 
present. 
8
 There is some overlap in the database where both LPs invested in the same fund, but this only 
occurred on a small number of occasions and does not serve to alter the results.  
9
 The average terminated fund in the database commenced investing in 1989.  While the takedown of 
most funds is 100% of committed capital, there is a small number of funds (7%) whose aggregate 
takedown is different from the amount committed.  The biggest discrepancy is a fund from early in the 
sample period that only drew down 44% of the committed capital.  This shortfall of takedown to 
commitment did not indicate a lack of performance however, as the fund did generate a return of 
almost seven times the initial investment.  On one occasion an LP invested greater than the capital 
committed (115%) and this fund was also profitable. 
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The investment activity of the LPs is reasonably constant throughout the 1980s.  
There is a large drop in the combined venture investing activity of the LPs in the early 
1990’s, when the number of terminated funds fell back to typically 7 or fewer funds 
each year.  Most of the funds raised over the last decade are still active, i.e. the GP has 
not yet fully drawn down the committed capital and/or a component of the investment 
returns is yet to be realised.   The second column in Table I presents the number of 
active funds by vintage year.  The bracketed terms are the number of active funds that 
may be classified as “effectively terminated”; that is, the residual fund value is less 
than 10% of the total distributions to date.  From the total set of 251 active funds, we 
deem 69 to be effectively terminated, the residual value of which is unlikely 
materially to change the fund’s performance metrics.  As a guide to the net activity of 
the LPs over the entire sample period, the third column shows the total number of 
funds by vintage year.   
 
To provide some sense of the activity of the LPs relative to the industry as a whole, 
Figure I presents a plot of the total number of funds in the database by vintage year 
and a plot of the number of new venture funds by vintage year as reported by VE.  
The overall correlation between these two series is 0.859 and the rate of investment by 
the LPs in new funds closely mirrors the overall trends in the number of new funds 
established in the industry.  One notable exception was during the late 1980’s, where 
the LPs were investing in an increasing number of funds whereas the number of new 
funds in the industry was relatively stable.   
 
It is possible that the increased number of investments made during the period leading 
up to the dot.com boom may reflect a higher number of smaller investments designed 
to spread risk or take advantage of the myriad of opportunities that presented 
themselves during that period.  To test this possibility, the latter part of Table I 
presents information on the average commitments of the LPs for terminated, active 
and all funds.  It is clear from these figures that not only were the LPs investing in 
more funds, but that their average investment in the industry has also increased (the 
total investment figures mirrored this result).  This is true for both terminated and 
active funds.  In fact, around the time of the dot.com boom, the LPs invested in more 
funds and commited higher levels of capital than at any other time.  These trends are 
reflected in the aggregate data: the amount of money committed to venture investing 
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rose from $10 billion in 1995 to $106 billion in 2000 before dropping back to less 
than $10 billion in 2002.10  To benchmark this data against the overall industry trend, 
Figure II presents a plot of the average commitment for the LPs relative to the average 
size of a fund in the VE database.  The correlation between these two series is 0.729 
and both the LPs and the average size of the fund in the industry are closely linked.  It 
is interesting to note that, during the bubble period when the average fund size 
increased markedly, the average commitment of the LPs was reasonably stable 
(although as previously discussed, they were investing in more funds).  
  
Panel A and B of Table II presents a summary of the investment life-cycle of the 136 
terminated and effectively terminated funds respectively.11 The highly heterogeneous 
nature of the funds is reflected in these statistics, with each takedown percentage 
exhibiting a relatively large standard deviation and the range of takedowns covering a 
spectrum of 1 day (a sole initial investment is made with no further takedowns) to 
11.76 years to be fully invested.  These fund life metrics serve to highlight the 
typically long term nature of this type of investment.  Gompers and Lerner (2004) 
report that the contractual life of most funds is typically around 10 years with the 
option to extend subject to mutual agreement.  The 25th percentile fund in our 
terminated fund data has a life of 10.46 years, which suggests that a large proportion 
of funds will seek to extend their life beyond the initial agreed term. 
 
Panel A and B of Table III presents a summary of the takedowns and distributions of 
the terminated and effectively terminated funds respectively.  Focussing on the 
terminated funds, the average total takedown by a fund is $4.8 million, with most 
investments in the range of $1.7 to $6.0 million.  With respect to the total distributions 
made by the GP to the LP, the average total distribution of $14.3 million is around 3 
times greater than the average fund takedown and the median distribution of $7.4 
million is around twice the median takedown.  The distributions are highly variable 
however, as evidenced by the standard deviation of $22.6 million.  While we do not 
                                               
10
 NVCA 2007 Yearbook, Figure 2.02, p. 23. 
11
 The average number of years till 25% of the committed capital is drawn down is 0.37, and the 
average fund was 50% drawn down after 1.30 years, 75% invested after an average of 2.24 years and 
fully invested after 4.61 years.  The average fund is fully redeemed after 12.90 years and the standard 
deviation is 4.04 years, which highlights the highly variable nature of a venture fund’s life.  The longest 
fund in the sample had a life of almost 25 years before all investments were redeemed, while the fund 
with the shortest life was active for only 2.48 years.   
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know the absolute size of the funds, the ratio of total distributions to total takedowns 
to and from our LPs (the ‘fund multiple’) is a useful measure of fund performance, as 
discussed in Section III below. 
 
The average terminated fund has 11 takedowns: most funds make between 4 and 15 
calls against committed capital and the average takedown at each call is $0.524 
million.  To put these takedowns in context, it is possible to express the average size 
of a funds takedown relative to the total takedowns.  The average takedown is 18% of 
the committed capital and most takedowns are between 7% and 25%.  In some cases 
though, the takedown can be very small (the lowest is 2%) and the six funds with a 
sole takedown provide the upper limit of 100%.  
 
The distributions from a venture fund can be in the form of either cash or stock.  By 
definition, stock distributions follow on a company going public, and they are 
typically subject to a 180-day holding period covenant.  Cash distributions on the 
other hand, can be generated by the sale of a company to an acquirer or by the sale of 
post-IPO stock on the market.  Discussions with industry participants suggest that 
cash distributions are more likely to come from an acquisition, as GPs will typically 
distribute stock and leave it to the LP to decide whether to hold the stock or sell.   
 
The distributions to the LPs by venture funds are typically well spread out across time 
(Table II).  Panel A of Table III shows that the average number of distributions per 
fund is 30, with one fund making 108 distributions over a 9 year period.  There are 11 
cash distributions per fund on average, while for stock distributions, the average is 20.  
The average size of a distribution is $0.541 million, almost identical to the average 
takedown.  The average size of a cash distribution is $0.396 million and the average 
size of a stock distribution is almost double ($0.582 million).   
 
III. Venture Capital Fund Performance 
 
The two most commonly used performance metrics are fund multiple, which 
measures the total distributions relative to the total takedown, and the internal rate of 
return (IRR), which takes into account the time value of money.  Tables IV and V 
summarise venture fund performance using these two measures for the sample of 
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terminated and effectively terminated funds as well as a combined sample of funds.  
The following discussion shall focus solely on the IRR results, as a discussion of the 
estimated fund multiples does not furnish any additional insights and they are 
presented for the sake of completeness.   
 
Table IV presents a summary of the IRR for the 136 terminated (Panel A) and 
effectively terminated (Panel B) funds.  Panel B of Table IV also summarises the size 
(absolute and relative to the total distributions of the fund) of the residual for these 
effectively terminated funds.  The median return for the terminated funds is 17%, the 
average return is 27%, with a maximum of 256% and a minimum of -94%.  The 
standard deviation of the distribution is 44%. Most funds generated a positive return 
of between 7% and 33% while 19 funds had a negative IRR.  The IRR of the 
effectively terminated funds (Panel B of Table IV) is extraordinary, with an average 
of 85% and a median of 61%. The lower degree of skew in this sub-sample suggests 
that the extreme market conditions of the Bubble years outweighed the idiosyncratic 
talents of the individual GPs.  We return to consider the impact of the dotcom bubble 
more fully later in the paper.   
 
The combined sample performance metrics (Table V) again illustrates the dispersion 
of returns, as the average IRR of 47% is almost twice the median IRR of 24%.  The 
range of IRRs across these venture capital funds is substantial and serves to highlight 
the dispersion of the returns to this type of investing.  By way of comparison, Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005) report a median (mean) venture fund IRR of 11% (17%), and a 
standard deviation of 34%, which is lower than the sample of funds that form the 
focus of this paper. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) report an average IRR of 
19.8%, which is also substantially below the estimated mean IRR of the sample 
analysed in this paper.  As will be discussed at greater length below, the performance 
of our sample is superior to that of the VC industry as a whole. 
 
A notable feature of the venture fund performance metrics is the small number of 
extremely high performing funds, which result in high positive skewness coefficients. 
To characterise these outliers, each of Tables IV and V contains a summary of the top 
decile of the sample.  The top decile of terminated funds ranked by IRR has an 
average value of 127% and the median is 93%, while the top decile of the effectively 
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terminated funds has an average IRR of 301% and a median IRR of 292%.  The 
impact of these top performing funds on overall portfolio performance is 
considerable.  To highlight the significance of this skewness of venture fund returns, 
the performance measures are re-estimated excluding the top decile of funds ranked 
by IRR or multiple.  In this case, the median IRR for the terminated funds falls to 15% 
with a standard deviation of 22%, and, if the top quintile is excluded, the median IRR 
is 12% with a standard deviation of 19%.  In both cases, the mean and median metric 
are very close.  Again, excluding the top deciles and quintiles from the set of 
effectively terminated funds substantially reduces the IRRs: without the top decile the 
median IRR is 45% and the standard deviation is 56% and without the top quintile the 
median IRR is 39% and the top quintile is 45%.   
 
A final observation on venture fund performance relates to the average fund 
performance through time.  As stated in the introduction, the venture fund industry 
has grown considerably since the start of the data sample period.  It is interesting to 
examine the average fund performance over time given this increasing competition in 
the industry.  To this end, Table V presents a breakdown of these performance metric 
summaries by vintage year, where vintage year is arbitrarily split into the periods 
1980 – 1984, 1985 – 1989, 1990 – 1994 and 1995 – 2006.  It must be remembered 
that these funds are grouped by vintage year and the IRR relates to cash flows well 
into the future.  Keeping this point in mind, both the average IRR and fund multiple 
have increased over time.  For example, the average IRR for all funds with a vintage 
year of 1980 – 1984 is 17%.  The funds raised in the second half of the 1980s had an 
average IRR of 23%, while for the first half of the 1990s, it is 42%.  Finally, the most 
recent vintage group of funds has an average IRR of 86%.  The skewness of these 
results however, biases these figures as the median IRR is below the mean in each 
period.  The standard deviation of fund returns is also reported in Table V.  Over each 
of the four periods distinguished, the standard deviation of the IRRs and fund multiple 
has increased.  Thus, although the median returns vary across time, the average 
returns and the variability of the data have generally increased.  This evidence clearly 
highlights the extreme skewness of the fund returns as an important characteristic of 
the data.   
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A.  Public Equity Performance Compared to Venture Fund Performance 
 
One of the most contentious issues in the venture capital literature is whether private 
equity outperforms public market equity and whether any alpha earned is sufficient to 
compensate the investor for the illiquidity of this type of investment and the risk that 
it carries.  Our database of precisely dated venture fund cash flows provides an ideal 
opportunity to cast light on this issue, and in this paper the following process is 
adopted.  For each terminated fund, the schedule of cash takedowns is retained.  At 
each point in time a takedown occurs, however, it is assumed that an equivalent 
amount of money is invested in public equity.  Redemptions from this hypothetical 
investment are matched to the date of the distribution from the venture fund.  
Specifically, a portion of the invested amount is redeemed that is equal to the 
percentage of total distribution received from the fund on that date.  This money is 
assumed to be held at face value for the remaining life of the fund.  In this way, a 
series of dated investments and redemptions is created that represents the return to the 
investor if he had invested his money in the public equity market rather than the 
venture fund.  The public equity market in this case is proxied in the first instance by 
the S&P500.  Due to the speculative nature of the type of firms a venture fund invests 
in, it is possible to argue that the NASDAQ market index is a more suitable proxy.  
Thus, both are considered.   
 
Table VI presents a summary of these results for the terminated funds. The average 
fund multiple when the fund outflows are invested in the S&P500 is 2.00 and for the 
NASDAQ is 2.42, which are both below the 3.65 multiple generated for the actual 
funds themselves.  Thus, the average return on investment in the S&P500 generated a 
doubling of the capital, whereas the venture funds generated a return that is well over 
triple the invested amount.  The most noticeable difference between these 
hypothetical multiples and their actual values is the standard deviation of multiples 
across the set of hypothetical funds, which are 0.53 and 0.83 for the S&P500 and 
NASDAQ respectively.  These are around fifteen times smaller than the distribution 
of the actual fund multiples.  The range of observations provides further insights into 
this result, as the highest observed multiple for these proxy investments in the 
S&P500 is 3.85 (or 5.05 in the case of the NASDAQ), whereas the actual highest 
multiple generated is 96.10.   
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As an alternative method of assessing the relative performance of venture funds, it is 
possible to estimate the IRR of the cash flows from the hypothetical S&P500 and 
NASDAQ based investments: a summary of the estimates is presented in Table VI.  
The average IRR of the hypothetical S&P investment is 12%, which approximates the 
long term rate of return on the US stock market.  The average IRR for the NASDAQ 
funds is 16%.  The range of investment returns generally falls within a narrow band of 
between 11% and 14% for the S&P500 with a higher upper bound for the NASDAQ 
(21%).  Some S&P500 based investments that had distributions that were focussed 
around the 2000 – 2002 dot.com build-up period did particularly well (the maximum 
is 27%) and those that were exposed to the downside of the bubble bursting did badly 
(the minimum is -17%), but these were certainly the exception, given that the majority 
of the funds were terminated prior to 1998.  When the top decile and quintile of funds 
are excluded from these S&P500 and NASDAQ hypothetical investments, the average 
and median metrics only change by a relatively small amount.  Thus, the skewness of 
these hypothetical funds is not nearly as influential as for the actual sample of venture 
funds.  
 
To aid in the interpretation of these results, Figure III presents a plot of the IRR of 
each terminated fund against their respective S&P 500 based IRR.  Any fund that falls 
on the solid line in the figure performs in line with the public equity market over the 
same period.  Where a fund falls above the solid line, it outperforms the S&P500 and 
where it falls below the line, it underperforms relative to the return the same 
investment would have made in the S&P500 over the same period.  The majority of 
funds are clustered around the 10% to 15% IRR nexus. A small but distinct group of 
high performing funds is clearly evident however, and it does not appear that their 
performance is contingent on the public equity market conditions.  Thus, these results 
highlight the importance of a select group of funds that generate the skewness in the 
returns data and cause the mean and the median performance metric to deviate 
substantially.   
 
A more direct comparison of the returns from a fund’s distributions with those of the 
public market benchmarks is provided by Kaplan and Schoar’s (2005) Public Market 
Equivalent (PME) metric.  The PME is the total disbursements to a fund expressed 
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relative to the total distributions to a hypothetical investment in either the S&P500 or 
the NASDAQ index.  A PME of greater than one signifies that the fund has 
outperformed its benchmark.  A summary of this PME performance metric for the 
terminated funds is provided in Table VI. When the S&P500 is the public market 
benchmark, the average PME is 1.98, whereas for the NASDAQ it is 1.59.  This 
means that the venture funds generated distributions that are on average 98% (59%) 
higher than the distributions generated by the S&P500 (NASDAQ) based 
investments.  In some instances, the differences are quite marked as the maximum 
PME for the S&P benchmark is 58.44, while the minimum is 0.20.  Not surprisingly, 
the standard deviation and skewness of the PME metric is quite high for the entire 
sample and excluding the top decile causes a marked fall in these estimates.  Thus, 
these observations with respect to the PME reinforce the earlier discussion of the 
variance of venture fund returns relative to forms of public equity market investment.   
 
Comparing these S&P500 and NASDAQ based IRR estimates to the actual average 
IRR of the venture investments (27%), it is clear that the sample of funds performed 
substantially better than the public equity market.  Thus, in contrast to Moskowitz and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Gottschlag, Phalippou and Zollo (2004), Phalippou and 
Zollo (2005), Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Phalippou and Gottschlag (2007), the 
evidence provided by the sample of funds in this paper finds that a portfolio of 
venture funds can offer a higher rate of return compared to public market equity.  
Another way of comparing these hypothetical public market investments to the 
sample of venture funds, however, is to use a simple measure of reward relative to the 
dispersion of returns.  The average IRR of the venture funds expressed relative to the 
standard deviation of those returns is equal to 0.61.  When the median fund return is 
used, the ratio falls to 0.38.  By way of comparison, for the sample of hypothetical 
S&P investments the equivalent ratio is 2.0.  When the Nasdaq is considered, the 
measure is equal to 1.6.  Thus, while the high degree of skewness of the venture funds 
provides an average return that is well above that of public equity; once the variability 
of those returns is taken into consideration, public equity provides a superior 
variability-adjusted level of reward.   
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B.  Venture Fund Performance Relative to the Industry 
 
The analysis of the previous section provides clear evidence that the venture funds 
sampled in this paper outperform public market equity as proxied by either a general 
market index (S&P500) or a more speculative public equity market index 
(NASDAQ).  This raises the question as to whether the investment track record of 
these LPs is representative of the industry as a whole.  That is to say, do most LPs 
outperform the public equity market or do our LPs outperform their peers?   
 
One possible approach to answering this question would be to replicate the 
hypothetical fund analysis of the previous section using a venture industry index in 
place of the S&P500 or NASDAQ indexes.  While a number of attempts have been 
made to construct venture capital investment indices (see Peng, 2001, Chen, Baeirl 
and Kaplan, 2002,  Woodward and Hall, 2003, and Hwang, Quigley and Woodward, 
2003), our analysis will focus on the Woodward and Hall (2004) ‘Sandhill’ index, 
which is available over the period December, 1988 to the end of the sample period.  
This Sandhill data is based on firm level valuations and so provides gross return 
estimates.   This creates a problem as the LP cash flow data used in this paper is net of 
fees.  Thus, to provide a fair basis for comparison, some adjustment must be made to 
account for the likely fees a GP would receive.  Metrick and Yasuda (2007) provide 
some guidance on this issue.  In their study, they report that the average expected 
revenue for the general partners of venture funds per $100 of committed capital is 
$24.18 over the life of the fund.  That is to say, a GP is likely to charge management 
fees and receive a share of profits (‘carried interest’) totalling 24.18% of committed 
capital, with the surplus distributed to the LPs.  
 
For the sample of terminated venture funds, a matched hypothetical fund is created 
assuming  that each fund takedown is invested in the market index.  A redemption is 
made from each hypothetical fund at the time of the actual redemptions, assuming the 
money is invested in the venture capital market as proxied by the Sandhill venture 
index.  This money is then held at face value for the remaining life of the fund.  Thus, 
an equivalent set of cash flows is generated that mimic an equivalent investment in 
the general venture industry.  Table VII presents a summary of this information and 
the average (median) IRR of the synthetic venture market investment is 33% (35%) 
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with a standard deviation of 20%.12  Recall that Metrick and Yasuda (2007) suggest 
that the average income to the general partners is 24.18% of the gross return.  This 
means that after fees, the venture industry provides an average net return of 
approximately 25% to the limited partners.     
 
To provide a fair basis for comparison, the IRR of the sample of venture funds 
included in this paper must be calculated over the same period.  To this end, Table VII 
presents the summary metrics for this restricted sample: the average net IRR for this 
subset of the data is 34%, with a standard deviation of 60%.  Thus, the funds in the 
sample have outperformed relative to the Sandhill market benchmark adjusted for fees 
by 9%.  The equivalent analysis based on the multiple performance metric for the 
synthetic industry funds provided an average investment multiple of 4.26 with a 
standard deviation of 2.56.  The average multiple for the restricted sample of LP funds 
is 4.82 with a standard deviation of 12.37.  Finally, in terms of the PME, the average 
is 1.24.  Recall a PME of greater than one indicates out-performance relative to the 
specified benchmark and so this metric reinforces the IRR and multiple metrics that 
show the sample of venture funds have outperformed relative to the industry as 
measured by the Sandhill index.    
 
An alternative approach to benchmarking the performance of our LPs may focus on 
the quarterly cash flow information provided by the VE database.  Unfortunately, the 
aggregate nature of this data means that it is not possible to identify which cash flows 
belong to which fund.  This means that the timing of the cash flows cannot be 
identified and so, a rate of return type analysis is not possible.  It is possible however, 
to establish the aggregate multiple by vintage year by dividing the sum of the total 
distributions divided by the total takedowns for all funds raised in a particular vintage 
year.  This measure therefore, provides a proxy for the average multiple earned across 
a sample of all funds raised in each vintage year.   
 
Table VIII presents the aggregate multiple across all funds in the VE database for 
each vintage year in the sample period.  For the first vintage year in the sample, $1.75 
billion was taken down and $4.21 billion was distributed, giving a fund multiple of 
                                               
12
  It should be noted that the volatility of the Sandhill Index is substantially lower than for other time 
series of venture performance. 
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2.40 for the 1980 vintage.  The aggregate fund multiple drops to below 2 in the 
following year and remains at that level for the first half of the 1980’s.  The venture 
fund industry performance improved after 1985 and the fund multiples are 
consistently above 2 for the rest of this decade.  The mid-90s is characterised by 
increasing multiples for funds raised during this period, peaking at 4.15 for funds with 
a vintage year of 1996. The more recent data must be interpreted with some caution as 
the declining multiples are not necessarily indicative of the dot.com boom and inferior 
performance.  Recall that as the vintage year moves closer to 2007, a higher 
proportion of funds will have residual values.  Thus, the multiple estimate is biased 
downwards, most obviously in the last year of the sample where no fund has made 
any distributions and the estimated multiple is zero.   
 
To compare the LPs in this paper to this VE data, it is necessary to estimate the 
average multiple by vintage year for all funds in the database.  Table VIII presents 
this information, and the trends observed for the VE database are mirrored in the 
investment experience of the LPs that form our sample (the correlation is 0.84).  
Specifically,  after a period of declining performance in the early 1980’s, fund 
performance progressively improved till the mid-1990’s until the funds that are still 
active begin to dominate, causing the multiples to decline.   
 
Comparing the industry to our LPs, it is interesting to note that the average LP 
multiple is greater than the industry average in every year except 1981, 1983, 1991 
and 2004.  That is, the total distributions from the venture funds in which the LPs 
have invested have exceeded the investment amount by more than the industry 
average in almost every year.  Specifically, the fund multiple has been higher than the 
industry average by 181% across all the years in the sample and in some cases the 
difference has been very substantial.  For example, the industry multiple for funds of 
vintage year 1996 is 4.15, where as for the LPs in this study the average multiple is 
12.73, i.e., a difference of 307%.   
 
In general, the results of Section III reveal that the average return for the sample of 
funds is above that of both the public equity market and also the industry itself.   
These excess returns are the result of a small number of extremely high performing 
 20 
funds.  In the absence of these outliers however, the level of fund performance is more 
in keeping with public equity market returns.   
 
IV. Venture Fund Performance Persistence 
 
The results of the previous section suggest a high degree of persistence in the out-
performance of our LPs relative to the industry over a period covering more than a 
quarter of a century.  By way of contrast, virtually no evidence of return persistence 
has been found in the context of the general equity funds management industry, even 
over much shorter periods of time (for a survey see Kazemi, Schneeweis and 
Pancholi, 2003 and more recently Bollen and Buse, 2005, and Wang, 2006).  The 
persistence observed in this sample of data may well reflect the significant experience 
and contacts the LPs have accumulated after almost 30 years of investing, factors 
which Gomper, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2006),  and Hochberg, Ljungqvist 
and Lu (2007) suggest are important elements to successful venture investing.  For 
example, Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai (2007, p. 734) report that “anecdotes in the 
private equity industry suggest that established LPs often have prefential access to 
funds”. 
 
The combined sample of 205 terminated and effectively terminated funds captures the 
investment track record of the industry over a long period of time.   This database may 
be used to provide some insights into the persistence of venture fund performance, 
which in this industry may be high as a successful GP is more likely to be able to raise 
a follow on fund.  In this case, the performance of a fund may be related to its 
sequence number.  To test this hypothesis, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) specify the 
following regression equation: 
 
IRRi = β0 + β1 IRRi-1 [+ β 2 IRRi-2] + εt    (2)  
 
that is, the IRR of fund i is regressed against the IRR of the GPs previous fund.  The 
results of applying this regression equation to the sub-sample of funds for which we 
have sequence numbers are presented in Table IX, where all standard errors are 
corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.  In the first column of results, 
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the regression equation only includes the IRR of the most recent fund and a positive 
and significant result is generated.  The second column of Table IX presents the 
regression results where the two most recent funds are included as regressor terms and 
the first lagged fund retains its sign and significance; however, the second lagged fund 
is insignificant. A lack of data prevents higher lags of funds being tested.  Table IX 
also includes the same set of regression output where the fund multiple is specified as 
the measure of performance.  The results are qualitatively consistent to the IRR results 
as the one period lagged multiple is positive and significant and the second period lag 
is insignificant.  These results are similar to those of Kaplan and Schoar (2005), 
except that their second lag fund IRR coefficient was also positive and significant.  
The outlier high performing funds in the sample provide an interesting example of 
fund performance persistence as eight of the top 10 funds ranked by IRR, produced a 
follow on fund that generated an IRR in excess of 100%.  This is consistent with the 
evidence of Gompers Kovner Lerner and Scharfstein (2006a), who find that VCs with 
a track record of success are likely to be successful in the future.  Thus, the data 
provides clear evidence of fund performance persistence and suggests that the past 
fund return is indicative of current fund performance.   
 
V. Venture Fund Performance and the Public Equity Market 
 
The early empirical and theoretical work on venture capital frequently assumed that 
the performance of private equity is independent of the public equity sector (see inter 
alia Cochrane, 2000) and many investment professionals also shared this belief.  For 
example, Gompers and Lerner (2004, p. 354) state:  
 
 “… many institutions … have increased their allocation to venture 
capital … in the belief that the returns of these funds are largely 
uncorrelated with the public markets.”  
 
More recently, this assumption has been called into question and a literature has 
evolved that considers venture capital investment performance in the context of 
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broader capital market conditions.13  This includes the theoretical work of Inderst and 
Muller (2004) and, most relevant in the current context, the empirical research of 
Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005) and Kaplan and Schoar (2005).  The 
former explore the relationship between shifting valuations and activity in public and 
private equity markets and find “that an important component of volatility in venture 
capital investment activity is driven by volatility of fundamentals” (p. 3): further they 
observe that “…an increase in IPO activity from the bottom to the top quartile 
increases the number of [venture] investments by 22%” (p. 10).  Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005, p. 1792) found evidence of substantial persistence of investment returns in 
both the venture and the LBO sectors.  They link this persistence to market conditions 
and conclude that “…funds raised when market returns are higher are less likely to 
raise a follow-on fund …. This suggests that funds raised in boom times are more 
likely to perform poorly and, therefore, are unable to raise a follow-on fund”.   
 
A number of authors have gone a step further and specifically identified the state of 
the market for initial public offerings (IPOs) as a key driver of venture performance.  
For example, Metrick (2006, p. 100) argues: 
“Without a doubt, the most important driver of VC investment is the 
existence of a lucrative market to exit these investments. … The most 
profitable exits are achieved through initial public offerings.”  
Jeng and Wells (2000), Das, Jagannathan and Sarin (2003) and Gompers and Lerner 
(2004) link the state of the IPO market to the amount and profitability of venture 
capital investing.  While these studies have broadly identified the state of the IPO 
market as a factor affecting venture capital returns, they stop short of actually 
undertaking a detailed characterization of the evolving state of the IPO market 
through time.   
 
 
                                               
13
 A related literature has found links between the public and private equity sectors.  For example, 
Lerner (1994) finds that biotechnology firms go public when equity market valuations are high.  Barry 
(1998) finds that VC returns follow cycles of performance. Black and Gilson (1998) highlight the 
importance of an active stock market for growth of a VC industry.  Phalippou and Zollo (2006) find 
that the performance of private equity funds is related to the state of the business cycle and the stock 
market.  
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A.  Public Equity Market Classification 
 
The goal of this section of the paper is to provide a formal analysis of the link 
between the public equity market and the performance of the venture investment 
industry.  This necessitates the classification of the state of the IPO market.  A number 
of different approaches to identifying a hot issue market have been used such as 
periods of high IPO returns (Ritter, 1984), NBER  business cycle peaks (Choe, 
Masulis and Nanda, 1993) and scaled issue volume (Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996).  
While useful, we argue that it is possible to specify a measure that is more appropriate 
in the current context.   
 
Recall that venture capitalists will typically prefer to exit via an IPO.14  Thus, a 
favourable market from a venture capitalists point of view is one which conditions are 
conducive to listing.  In this case, IPO activity, or more specifically venture-backed 
IPO activity, is relevant.  Further, the sooner the venture capitalist is able to exit the 
investment by bringing the firm to market, all other things being equal, the greater 
will be the IRR.  Thus, the ideal state of the IPO market from the perspective of a 
venture capitalist is when it is possible to list a firm before it has become profitable.  
In this situation, venture capitalists are able to exit the investment and realise a return 
earlier than if they have to wait for the company to become profitable.  Thus, the 
market classification measure needs to be based on the listing activity of venture-
backed companies, including information on the profitability of these companies. 
 
The VE database15 has information on all US IPOs and includes a flag that denotes a 
firm as having received venture funding.  This flag is used to distinguish VC from non 
VC-backed IPOs and uniquely identifies 3,032 VC-backed IPOs.  For each of these 
companies, company financial information is acquired from a variety of sources.  In 
the first instance, companies are identified in Compustat using SEDOL, CUSIP and 
ISIN identifiers and company profit information for the last financial year prior to 
                                               
14
 Das, Jagannathan and Sarin (2003) report higher exit valuation for IPOs in comparison to exits by 
merger or acquisition. Ross and Isenstein (1988) report that a $1 investment in a firm that goes public 
provides an average cash return of $1.95 beyond the initial investment, while an acquisition yields a 
cash return of only 40 cents.  Further, the option to exit via IPO improves bargaining power with any 
potential acquirer. 
15
 The VE provides a database of 12,066 U.S. IPOs over the period 1980 to 2006, which compares 
reasonably with the Ritter IPO database of 11,209 companies over the same period.   
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listing is extracted as well as the year of listing.  Thus, if a company listed on June 5, 
1996 and its reporting date is December 31, the company financials to the year ended 
December, 1995 are recorded as the year prior to IPO.  These financials represent the 
last complete set of corporate information for that company that investors would have 
had access to at the time the company was listing.  The financials submitted for the 
year ended December 1996, are classified as belonging to the year of the IPO.  Where 
a company could not be found in the Compustat database, the Osiris and Datastream 
databases are accessed.  These alternative databases are used to verify the Compustat 
information as well as to fill in gaps where possible.  Using this process, financial 
information for a total of 2375 companies is gathered, which represents 78% of our 
sample.  Most of the missing data relates to companies that listed in the early part of 
the sample when company coverage across these three databases is the least complete.  
Nonetheless, we argue that this list of companies is sufficient to provide a 
representative cross section of the companies that were listing at the point in time and 
so allow us to characterise the market conditions with reasonable accuracy. 
 
Figure IV presents a summary of the total number of IPOs, the total number of VC-
backed IPOs and the total number of VC-backed IPOs that were unprofitable at the 
time of listing per quarter over the sample period (the Appendix presents the data in 
full).  The number of VC-backed IPOs closely tracks the total IPO data: the 
correlation between the two series is 0.8436.  On average, 24% of all IPOs coming to 
market in the sample period were VC-backed, although this varies from a high of 53% 
in 1999Q4 to a low of only 6% in 2002Q3.  This data highlights how vulnerable GPs 
are to changing market fortunes in terms of their ability to exit an investment.   
 
Examining the total number of IPOs, there are five distinct hot IPO markets that are 
identifiable: the peak of each occurs during the 1983Q4, 1986Q3, 1993Q4, 1996Q2 
and 2000Q1 periods.  It is interesting to note that the maximum number of IPOs 
during the dot.com bubble was actually the lowest of any of these hot-issue periods.  
This raises the issue as to what does distinguish the 2000 bubble market from other 
hot IPO markets, as these volume figures clearly demonstrate that it was not the 
number of IPOs.   
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To aid in the interpretation of this data, the lower panel in Figure IV presents the 
percentage of unprofitable VC-backed IPOs.  The average across the sample is 41%. 
However, this ranges from only 3% in 1984Q4 to 83% in 2000Q4.  The ability of VCs 
to bring firms that were unprofitable to market increased through the 1990s (the spike 
in 1990Q4 is a reflection of the small number of IPOs during this period) and peaked 
during the dot.com boom, when virtually all of the VC-backed listings were 
unprofitable.  In the aftermath of the 2000 crash, the number of  VC-backed IPOs fell 
to historically low levels (the 25 VC-backed IPOs in 2002 is the lowest for any year in 
the sample period) and the high percentage of unprofitable IPOs per quarter is a 
reflection of the small number of listings during this period.  Thus, the 2000 bubble 
period is not distinguished by the number of companies that listed during this period, 
but the fact that an unprecedented number of unprofitable companies were coming to 
market during this time.16   
 
To capture the state of the market, a classification system is used that distinguishes a 
poor issue market (=1, when less than 20 VC-backed IPOs occurs17), a normal issue 
market (=2, when at least 20 but less than 40 VC-backed IPOs occur), a hot issue 
market (=3, when more than 40 VC-backed IPOs occur) and an ultra-hot issue market 
(=4, when more than 40 VC-backed IPOs occur, more than 50% of which are 
unprofitable).18  This last criteria identifies 1996Q2 and the period 1999Q2 to 2000Q3 
as ‘ultra-hot’.  This VC IPO market indicator may be used to consider whether a link 
exists between the state of the public equity market and venture capital returns.   
 
When venture capitalists invest in a firm, their return is a function of two factors.  On 
the one hand, the return is a function of the amount of the company they are able to 
secure for their initial investment.  This ownership percentage will reflect the 
competitive environment that prevails.  If there is a lot of VC money chasing few 
deals, then the firm has the upper hand.  Alternatively, where venture investing is out 
of favour and there are many deals chasing a limited supply of funds, the VCs have 
the upper hand and will be able to secure a better deal for their investment.  The 
                                               
16
 Ritter and Welch (2002) have also identified the size of the first day returns as a distinguishing 
feature of this period 
17
 These categorisations are based on the standard deviation of the number of VC backed IPOs for 
which we have financial data, which is arbitrarily rounded down from 21.9 to 20 for ease of exposition.   
18
 This classification system identifies hot and cold IPO markets that are generally consistent with those 
identified by Ritter (1984) and Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996).  
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evidence suggests that the volume of funds made available to the venture industry is 
directly linked to its performance, i.e., when the industry is doing well, people are 
more inclined to invest and so a greater supply of funds is available.  Where venture 
funds are performing poorly, investors typically seek alternative investments and 
funding is limited.  Thus, there is a direct link between the performance of VC funds 
and the amount of capital available for investment (see Gompers and Lerner, 2004, 
pp. 134-145).  VCs will rationally wish to invest in a firm when the market is 
performing poorly and they are able to negotiate the best deals. 
 
Once a VC has taken a stake in a company in return for an initial investment, the 
actual return on their investment is a direct function of how much is received for that 
stake on exit.  If the firm is able to list at a time when the public equity market has an 
appetite for VC-backed IPOs, this equity stake is likely to be worth more compared to 
when the firm lists in a normal market.  Ideally, the GP would want to list the 
company in an ultra-hot issue market and exit as soon as possible thereafter. 
 
We have used the data on VC-backed IPOs to generate an indicator of market 
conditions at the time when investments are made and when distributions are 
received.  As the investments and distributions are spaced irregularly through time 
however, it is necessary to weight the market conditions at the time of each cash flow 
by the proportion of total investment or distribution that it represents.  This gives a 
weighted market conditions indicator on entry and exit for each fund.  The lowest 
possible market condition score is a 1, which indicates that the all of the cash flows 
occurred in poor listing conditions.  The highest possible score is a 4, which indicates 
that the cash flows occurred in a hot issue market when more than 50% of all VC-
backed IPOs were unprofitable.   
 
To provide an overall market conditions score for each fund, the exit indicator less the 
entry indicator is used.  The optimal scenario is one in which the VC invests in the 
firm when there is a limited supply of money chasing deals and exits when there is a 
high demand for venture IPOs.  In terms of the market classification system, the 
optimal scenario occurs when the market conditions on entry are equal to 1 and on 
exit are equal to 4.  Thus, where the overall market conditions indicator is +3, there is 
little money chasing deals on entry and a ultra-hot issue market on exit.  The worst 
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possible scenario for a VC fund is when the general market conditions indicator is -3, 
i.e. the fund has invested in an ultra-hot market and exited in a poor market.   
 
Table X presents a summary of the entry, exit and overall market conditions indicator 
across all terminated and effectively terminated funds.  The average entry (exit) 
conditions indicator across all funds is 2.19 (2.52) and most funds generated an 
indicator of between 1.60 (2.14) to 2.70 (2.98).  The average market conditions metric 
across all funds is 0.33.  That is, the difference between the capital weighted entry and 
exit conditions is small.  The range of observations however, shows that for some 
funds, the entry and exit conditions were markedly different.  The maximum value for 
the market conditions indicator is 2.36 and the minimum is -2.59.   
 
B.  Fund Performance and Market Conditions 
 
If public equity market conditions affect venture returns, the best performing funds 
should be associated with a high positive market indicator and the worst performing 
funds should be associated with a high negative market indicator.  Figure V presents a 
plot of the IRR and market conditions indicator for all terminated and effectively 
terminated funds, where the vintage year of each fund is highlighted with the use of 
different symbols.  Most funds in the sample exited in market conditions more 
favourable than they entered, i.e. the average market conditions estimate is positive.  
For the funds that did get it wrong and exited in conditions that were less favourable 
compared to when they invested, most are from the more recent period that includes 
the bubble.  Further, while a number of these funds did lose money, a few notable 
exceptions did well despite the market being against them.  Finally, where a fund is 
associated with a positive market conditions parameter, while most generated a 
positive IRR, it is not true that more favourable market conditions guarantee a higher 
IRR.  In fact, the funds that timed the market the best were very ordinary performing 
funds with positive, but relatively low IRRs.  The correlation between the market 
conditions and the fund IRR across all of the data presented in Figure V is 0.102. 
 
Panel A of Table XI presents a summary of the fund IRR and market conditions 
parameter.  The median IRR when the fund market conditions are less than minus one 
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is 4%.19  When the market conditions are neutral however, the median IRR is 27%.  It 
is interesting to note that when the fund has entered and exited the market in 
favourable conditions (an indicator of greater than plus one), the median IRR is 20%, 
which is less than the median for the neutral indicator.  One reason for this result may 
be the skewness of the data.  The standard deviation of the neutral conditions data is 
77%, which is higher than the standard deviation for the favourable and unfavourable 
market conditions data (60% and 52% respectively).  Further, the range of 
observations for the neutral market data is large.  To test the robustness of these 
results to the presence of these outliers, the top decile of funds in each category is 
excluded and a summary of this abbreviated dataset is presented in Panel B of Table 
XI.  Focusing on the median IRR, the poor market conditions indicator has a median 
IRR of -2%.  For the neutral and favourable market conditions indicator however, the 
same result is again evident in that both have a median IRR that is greater than where 
the market conditions are poor (24% and 18% respectively), but the favourable 
conditions median IRR is less than the neutral value.  Thus, some evidence of poor 
market conditions impacting on venture fund returns can be found, although the 
evidence does not support the contention that favourable market conditions lead to 
higher returns.   
 
Metrick (2006) suggests that exit conditions are an important influence on venture 
investment returns.  This suggests that it may be more appropriate to focus on exit 
conditions rather than an overall measure of market conditions. To this end, Figure VI 
presents a plot of the market exit conditions and IRR for each fund, with the vintage 
year of each fund highlighted with the use of different symbols.  The funds from the 
early 1980s and early 1990s are relatively clustered by exit conditions parameter.  The 
late 1980s funds are very widely dispersed, however, and only a few high performing 
funds are present.  The more recent period is characterised by funds that span the 
range of exit conditions and have some funds that have done exceptionally well, some 
that have performed poorly and still others that are more typical of the rest of the 
sample.   The correlation between the exit conditions and the fund IRR across all of 
the data presented in Figure VI is 0.417.  These results suggest that the exit conditions 
at the time of distributions are quite relevant in determining overall fund performance.   
                                               
19
 The equivalent information based on the fund multiple is qualitatively consistent to that presented 
here and is not presented to conserve space. 
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To clarify this result, Panel A of Table XI also presents a summary of the fund IRR 
grouped by fund exit conditions.  When the exit conditions are poor, the median IRR 
is 9%.  Neutral exit conditions however, are associated with a median IRR of 24%.  
On the other hand, when the exit conditions are favourable, the median IRR is 76%.  
The standard deviation of these IRR estimates is similar for the poor and neutral exit 
conditions indicator (42%), however, it is much higher when the exit conditions are 
favourable (110%).  This suggests that a small number of extremely high performing 
funds may be driving these results.   
 
To test the robustness of these results to the skewness of the data, Panel B of Table XI 
presents a summary of the performance data, grouped by market conditions and exit 
conditions, with the top decile of funds excluded.  The median IRR when the market 
conditions are unfavourable is -2%.  When neutral market conditions prevail, the 
median IRR is 24%, which is greater than the median IRR when favourable market 
conditions prevail (18%).  Where the data is categorised based on exit conditions, the 
results show that poor exit conditions are associated with an average IRR of 7%, 
neutral exit conditions produce a median IRR of 20% and favourable exit conditions 
generated an IRR of 69% (the skewness of the data is lowest of  the three categories in 
this case).   
 
Thus, the exclusion of the top decile of funds, in order to account for any bias caused 
by the skewness of the data, only serves to reinforce the full sample results discussed 
earlier.  The results of this analysis suggest that while poor market conditions lessen 
the probability of a venture fund performing well, it is the exit conditions of a fund 
that are more likely to result in high rates of return to investment.  In general, the data 
establishes a link between the conditions of the most relevant sector of the public 
equity market and venture fund performance.   
 
VI.  Venture Capital Funds and the Dot.Com Bubble 
 
The dot.com boom represents a period of unprecedented activity in the venture capital 
industry.  Specifically, the VE database reveals that more than double the number of 
funds were started during the 1999Q2 to 2000Q3 period in comparison to the first half 
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of that decade.  Further, these peak years greatly exceeded the previous peaks reached 
in 1984 and 1987.  NVCA industry data reveals that the number of fund and the 
dollars committed to the venture industry almost doubled in 1999 and doubled again 
in 2000.  The LPs in this paper were also unusually active during this period both in 
terms of the number of funds they invested in and the average commitment to each 
fund (Table I).   
 
It is an interesting empirical issue as to what impact this bubble period had on venture 
fund performance.  Unfortunately, the long-term horizon of the investment cycle 
means that only in the fullness of time, will the impact of these events come to be 
fully understood.  It is possible however to provide some preliminary insights using 
the sample of terminated funds and the subset of active funds that have a small 
residual value and may be considered effectively terminated.  This combined sample 
of funds may be sorted based on the proportion of their redemptions that are made 
during the bubble period.  Those that made a minimum of 50% of their distributions 
during the bubble period are selected for analysis.  Using this criterion, we identified a 
total of 56 funds, and an examination of their characteristics reveals that they are 
similar to the larger sample of residual funds discussed in the previous section in 
terms of takedowns, distributions and life cycle.  Consequently, the remainder of the 
analysis focuses solely on their performance metrics.     
 
A summary of the performance metrics for all funds that had a minimum of 50% of 
their distributions during the bubble period is presented in Table XII.  The average 
IRR (multiple) across these funds is 111% (7.94).  This is the highest set of 
performance metrics for any subset of the data considered in this paper and is a 
reflection of the premium that this class of investment was generating during this 
period.  Furthermore, the performance of venture funds during this period is not as 
skewed as the terminated fund sample.  The median fund IRR is 91% and when the 
top decile of funds is excluded, the average IRR is 85% and the skewness coefficient 
falls to 0.51.  An analysis of the fund multiple provides the same conclusions.  This 
suggests that the fund performance during this dot.com period is not characterised by 
just a small number of outlier funds, but that funds were doing well virtually across 
the board (although two funds in this sample did lose money, both of which were 
relatively small).  
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The sample of terminated and effectively terminated funds may also be used to 
characterise the performance of the venture capital industry after the collapse of the 
bubble in 2001Q1.  To this end, the sample of funds is sorted by the proportion of 
their distributions that occurred following the bubble period, and the funds with a 
proportion of greater than 50% are selected for analysis.  Table XII presents a 
summary of the performance metrics for these 28 funds. The median IRR is -3%.  
When the top decile of funds are excluded from the sample, this falls further to -7%.  
These returns not only represent a dramatic reversal relative to performance during 
the bubble.  They are also far below the returns generated by our terminated funds in 
all prior periods.  The average multiple is 2.37, which is similar to the terminated fund 
average where the top decile is excluded (2.41).  Excluding only three funds however, 
causes this average to fall by nearly 50% to 1.21.  It should not come as a surprise that 
a number of post-bubble funds managed to generate profits (12 of the 28 funds are 
profitable) or that positive skewness still characterises the data.  The end of the boom 
does not necessarily impose losses on venture capitalists.  The drop in listing activity 
meant that it was more difficult to exit an investment through an IPO, but not 
impossible if a firm had sound financials.  However, the number of VC-backed 
companies qualifying for listing was limited to those that were mature financially and 
the valuations achieved at offering were substantially below those of the bubble 
period.  Returns for the set of post-bubble funds reflect these realities. 
 
Our data permits one further exercise to explore the behaviour of venture capitalists 
during the bubble years: an investigation into the speed with which they invested the 
funds available to them or the intensity of investment.  To construct a measure of 
investment intensity, the following process is specified.  For each year in the sample, 
the available pool of capital is estimated as the sum of the amount of committed 
capital from previous years that has not yet been taken down by the GP and the capital 
committed for that year.  The total takedown for that year is estimated as a composite 
of the sum of takedowns for funds of the current vintage year as well as takedowns 
from funds of previous vintage years that are still actively investing.   The intensity of 
the fund takedown in a given year is the total takedown relative to the total amount of 
capital available for investment in that year.  Table XIII presents the data and it is 
plotted in Figure VII.  To provide an industry benchmark, the same information is 
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constructed using the VE database (note that the aggregate nature of the VE database 
means that it is not known which fund was drawing down in any given period, only 
the total value of the drawdowns).   
 
The correlation between the investment intensity measure for the sample of funds and 
the VE data is 0.32.  As the fund database only commences in 1980 whereas the VE 
database has data from 1969, the early part of the sample period may be biased for our 
sample of funds.  The correlation between the two series from 1985 onwards is 0.660.  
A number of spikes in the intensity of the investment process may be observed in the 
data, which correspond to the data for 1983, 1994 and 1999 – 2000.  It is interesting to 
note that each of these periods corresponds to the hot issue markets identified earlier.  
In particular, the bubble period is associated with an unprecedented level of 
investment activity which rose from 29% in 1996 (the sample low is only slightly less 
at 26% during the poor issue market of the late-1980s) to 64% in 1999 and the sample 
high of 71% in 2000.  Thus, we find evidence to suggest that GPs increase the 
intensity of the rate at which they invest in response to market conditions.   
 
In general, this evidence tends to suggest that not only is the listing activity of venture 
backed companies is high in a hot market (and by inference, the intensity of the 
distributions to LPs, should also be high), GPs must also pay higher prices to invest in 
new opportunities, which necessitates a larger drawdown of capital, i.e. a higher 
intensity of the investment process.  The implication is that venture capitalists 
accelerate their investment activity in the hope of capturing the extraordinary returns 
being generated by a hot IPO market (a goal that is only transiently achieved). 
 
It is unclear how representative these results are of the hundreds of venture funds that 
were raised and active during the dot.com bubble and the usual small sample caveats 
apply.  In due course, once the funds active during this period have been terminated, a 
complete analysis of the impact of the dot.com bubble on venture returns can be 
undertaken and its impact understood.  The preliminary results of this paper however, 
suggest that the level of venture investing during the bubble period was 
unprecedented and the returns to investors were extremely high.  Following the 
bursting of the buddle however, the average return to venture funds has been the 
lowest observed during the sample period.    In extreme form, the bubble period and 
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its aftermath illustrate the correlation between venture capital returns and the state of 
the IPO market. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
Venture capital is a significant part of the alternative investments industry.  The lack 
of public reporting and readily available data, however, means that relatively little is 
known about venture funds and their track record of investment performance.  In this 
paper, a database consisting of 136 terminated and 69 effectively terminated venture 
funds active over a 28 year sample period are considered.  For each fund, the 
takedown and distributions are recorded on a cash-in and cash-out basis.  As such, this 
sample overcomes many of the problems suffered by the previous literature in terms 
of using aggregated data or self-reported fund values. 
 
This sample of fund data is used to characterise investments in the venture industry.  
In terms of the performance of venture funds, both an IRR and a fund multiple based 
performance metric are considered.  The median IRR across all funds is 24%, while 
the median fund multiple is 2.66.  The investment performance of venture funds 
relative to both public market equity (proxied by the S&P500 and NASDAQ) as well 
as the industry itself is considered and a number of conclusions can be drawn.  First, 
our sample of venture funds outperforms both the S&P500 and NASDAQ over the 
sample period, albeit with very substantial dispersion of returns across the funds.  
Second, significant evidence of persistence in out-performance is observed, as the 
average fund multiple by vintage year is greater than that of the industry as measured 
using aggregate data sampled from the Thompson VE database and the Sandhill 
venture index.  Third, a high degree of skewness is evident in the data, such that a 
small number of high performing funds are responsible for the bulk of the excess 
returns to the portfolio as a whole.  Thus, our LPs enjoyed the benefit of having 
access to some of the top performers in the industry, and the consequent skewness of 
their venture portfolio returns is the decisive component of their alpha.  This may help 
to explain why past studies may have not been able to find any evidence of venture 
funds outperforming the public equity market.  If LPs are unable to secure an 
investment in the select grouping of high performing funds, they are unlikely to 
outperform any benchmark.  
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This paper also considers the relationship between the public equity market and the 
returns to venture investing.  Historically, public equity market conditions have been 
proxied by the total number of IPOs.  Given the focus of this paper however, the exit 
conditions are proxied by the total number of venture-backed IPOs with special 
attention given to the number of unprofitable venture IPOs to characterise the exit 
conditions for the industry.  The number of venture-backed IPOs is found to correlate 
with the IPO market as a whole.  The profitability of these IPOs, however, varies 
substantially, and the dot.com era in particular represented a unique environment, 
insofar as the number of unprofitable venture backed IPOs was noticeably higher than 
in any other period since 1980 and, in some quarters, was close to 100%.  Using a 
measure of exit conditions based on the number of venture backed IPOs and their 
profitability, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that the public equity 
market substantially influences venture returns.  Specifically, the median IRR realised 
when investments have been made in a competitive market and redeemed in an 
unfavourable market is 4%. On the other hand, the median IRR is 20% when the 
investments are made at a time when there is a shortage of such funds and the 
distributions are made at a time of favourable valuations.  However, the most 
important element of the investment conditions are those prevailing at the time of exit, 
which cause IRRs to vary substantially: from a median return of 9% in a poor IPO 
market environment to a median return of 76% in an ultra-hot IPO market 
 
The results reported in this paper on the relationship between VC returns and the state 
of the IPO market suggest certain directions for future research.  Specifically, the 
criteria for gaining access to the IPO market have varied greatly over time.  Analysis 
of those criteria and their determinants may provide insight into the context in which 
the venture capital industry continues to evolve.  An extended period of time in which 
the availability of the IPO market is strictly limited to more mature, profitable 
companies has negative implications both for prospective VC returns and eventually 
for the flow of funds to the VC industry. 
 
Finally, some preliminary evidence of venture fund performance during and 
immediately following the dot.com bubble is presented.  Given the life cycle of 
venture funds, only a relatively small number of terminated funds exist that cover this 
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period.  Using a sample of active funds and self-reported residual values, it is possible 
to make some observations about this period.  First, venture investing during this 
period was unprecedented both in terms of the number of funds and the size of the 
investments made.  Second, fund performance during the bubble was extraordinary, 
and the average performance of the funds is less driven by outliers as a large 
proportion of funds did well during this period.  Third, the rational desire to take 
advantage of Bubble conditions in the IPO market is reflected in the increased 
investment intensity during that period. 
 
Such performance reflected unprecedented access to the IPO market for unprofitable 
venture-backed companies.  The performance of the funds following the bursting of 
the bubble was dramatically lower not only relative to the bubble period but also to all 
periods prior to the bubble.  This reversal coincided with a radical constriction of the 
IPO market and its near absolute closure to unprofitable venture-backed companies. 
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Table I 
Summary of Fund Database by Year 
This table presents a summary of the number of terminated, active and effectively terminated funds in 
the database by vintage year.  Further, the average commitment of the LP to a fund is summarised by 
fund status and vintage year.  
 Number of Funds Average Commitment (000’s) 
Year 
Terminated 
Funds 
Active Funds 
(Effectively 
Terminated)  
All 
Funds 
Terminated 
Funds 
Active 
Funds 
All 
Funds 
1980* 6   6 877  877 
1981* 5   5 1,620  1,620 
1982* 5   5 2,400  2,400 
1983* 6   6 1,416  1,416 
1984* 6 1 (1) 7 2,100 3,000 2,228 
1985 9   9 3,158  3,158 
1986 15   15 3,331  3,331 
1987 13 3 (3) 16 3,196 3,000 3,170 
1988 11 3 (2)  14 4,777 3,333 4,468 
1989 12 2 (2)  14 6,041 4,000 5,749 
1990 4   4 7,033  7,033 
1991 4 1 (1) 5 7,720 4,000 6,976 
1992 7 4 (4)  11 4,823 5,000 4,862 
1993 5 2 (2)  7 5,171 11,750 7,051 
1994 4 8 (8)  12 4,205 8,511 6,789 
1995 6 9 (9)  15 6,928 5,730 6,243 
1996 3 8 (7) 12 14,728 13,708 14,048 
1997 3 11 (9) 14 6,422 11,471 9,956 
1998 4 17 (11) 21 10,916 10,409 10,544 
1999 5 29 (4)  34 12,941 15,357 14,721 
2000 1 39 (6) 40 18,422 10,176 10,568 
2001  22  22  11,825 11,825 
2002 2 9  11 814 10,542 7,299 
2003  9  9  19,837 19,837 
2004  12  12  21,497 21,497 
2005  20  20  17,907 17,907 
2006  31  31  16,159 16,159 
2007  11  10  16,034 16,034 
Total 136 251 (69) 387 - - - 
Note: * - only 1 Limited Partner was active during this period 
 : Effectively Terminated Funds are those funds that have a residual value of less than 
10% of the total distributions.   
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Table II 
Fund Takedown and Distribution Cycle Summary 
This table summarises the time taken for a fund to takedown the committed capital across the sample of 
terminated and effectively terminated funds.  The amount of time taken to distribute a given percentile 
of the total distributions is also presented.  Panel B summarises this information for the effectively 
terminated sample of funds.  Panel C summarises the takedown and distributions of the venture funds 
by year.  
 Takedown Distribution 
 25% 50% 75% 100% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
Panel A: Terminated Funds         
Average 0.37 1.30 2.24 4.61 4.94 6.48 7.95 12.90 
Median 0.06 1.27 2.19 4.13 5.13 6.68 8.19 12.94 
Stdev 0.48 1.07 1.39 2.55 1.95 2.12 2.47 4.04 
25
th
 Percentile 0.00 0.42 1.22 2.86 3.57 4.82 6.40 10.46 
75
th
 Percentile 0.72 1.91 3.15 6.18 6.42 8.16 9.62 15.32 
Max 2.53 7.65 9.01 11.61 8.69 10.75 12.97 24.58 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.34 2.16 2.48 
Panel B: Effectively Terminated  Funds 
Average 0.59 1.51 2.29 4.83 3.90 4.50 5.43 10.60 
Median 0.52 1.35 2.13 4.34 3.67 4.10 5.02 10.45 
Stdev 0.54 1.10 1.28 2.46 2.10 2.38 2.78 3.62 
25
th
 Percentile 0.18 0.93 1.52 3.08 2.23 2.66 3.63 8.13 
75
th
 Percentile 0.75 2.09 2.82 5.98 5.25 5.87 6.50 12.20 
Max 2.98 5.99 6.14 11.76 11.33 11.68 14.99 23.24 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 1.00 4.01 
Note: all figures are in years 
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Table III 
Summary of Fund Takedown and Distributions 
This table summarises the takedowns and distributions of the sample of terminated and effectively terminated funds in the sample.   
    TakeDown    Distributions   
 Total 
Takedown 
Total 
Distributions  Number Size 
Size/Total  
Takedown 
Number Number 
(Cash) 
Number 
(Stock) 
Size 
Size (Cash) 
Size  
(Stock) 
Panel A: Terminated Funds 
Average 4,855,667 14,383,297 11 524,010 18% 30 11 20 541,392 396,210 582,467 
Median 3,775,000 7,499,962 9 428,571 11% 28 8 13 301,614 218,353 325,018 
Stdev 4,704,654 22,611,150 8 437,000 20% 20 8 18 709,660 578,288 775,432 
25
th
 Percentile 1,754,344 3,186,464 4 276,810 7% 15 5 7 156,905 81,343 157,123 
75
th
 Percentile 6,003,221 16,037,387 15 585,558 25% 41 14 28 582,847 521,350 601,962 
Max 29,179,400 206,164,273 45 3,000,000 100% 108 34 76 4,624,042 4,624,042 4,708,884 
Min 400,000 284,006 1 699 2% 1 1 0 31,043 8,565 0 
Panel B: Effectively Terminated Funds 
Average 9,903,562 66,451,561 15 856,079 9% 42 13 28 1,822,875 524,944 2,404,010 
Median 6,999,999 22,950,101 17 526,316 6% 32 7 22 997,830 313,418 1,079,337 
Stdev 8,420,531 93,107,917 7 1,279,736 10% 37 19 26 2,312,773 547,529 3,013,469 
25
th
 Percentile 5,000,000 8,963,051 11 307,692 5% 18 4 11 287,378 164,133 415,357 
75
th
 Percentile 13,125,000 82,425,988 19 839,588 9% 50 13 38 2,525,460 834,378 3,542,579 
Max 52,011,904 443,267,157 40 9,250,000 50% 244 114 130 11,011,571 3,217,244 14,880,744 
Min 806,100 655,204 2 38,386 3% 7 0 0 19,271 4,900 3,384 
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Table IV 
Summary of Venture Fund Performance  
Panel A and B of this table summarises the performance of the terminated and effectively terminated funds in the database, respectively.  The residual value of the terminated 
funds in the database is also summarised at the end of the table, both in nominal terms and also as a percentage of the total distributions of the fund as at the end of the sample 
period.   
 Average Median St. Dev. 
 
Skewness 
25
th
 
Percentile 
75
th
 
Percentile Max. Min. 
Panel A: Terminated Funds         
Fund Multiple 3.65 2.34 8.33 10.31 1.50 3.93 96.10 0.18 
     - Top decile only 14.42 7.24 23.72 3.63 6.69 8.13 96.10 6.29 
     - Excluding top decile 2.41 2.01 1.43 0.75 1.42 3.15 5.97 0.18 
     - Excluding top quintile 2.04 1.89 1.03 0.30 1.22 2.77 4.25 0.18 
IRR  27% 17% 44% 2.49 7% 33% 256% -94% 
     - Top decile only 127% 93% 63% 1.12 82% 160% 256% 71% 
     - Excluding top decile 15% 15% 22% -1.06 6% 28% 70% -94% 
     - Excluding top quintile 11% 12% 19% -2.11 4% 24% 39% -94% 
Panel B: Effectively Terminated Funds         
Fund Multiple         
- Effectively Terminated Funds  5.82 3.76 6.13 2.08 1.82 6.50 32.45 0.58 
- Top decile 20.26 17.26 5.88 1.87 16.86 21.31 32.45 15.76 
- Excluding top decile 4.19 3.33 3.45 1.56 1.74 5.69 14.85 0.58 
- Excluding top quintile 3.19 2.90 1.94 0.57 1.65 4.23 7.55 0.58 
IRR          
- Effectively Terminated Funds  85% 61% 96% 1.98 15% 125% 515% -22% 
- Top decile 301% 292% 108% 1.42 228% 323% 515% 200% 
- Excluding top decile 61% 45% 56% 0.54 15% 108% 193% -22% 
- Excluding top quintile 48% 39% 45% 0.42 12% 85% 133% -22% 
Residual 1,355,340 485,883 2,133,199 - 108,155 1,271,694 9,735,209 1,565 
Residual / Total Distributions 3% 2% 3% - 1% 5% 10% 0% 
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Table V 
Performance Summary of Combined Sample of Terminated and Effectively Terminated Venture Funds  
This table summarises the combined performance of the terminated and effectively terminated funds in the database.  These metrics are also estimated for the top decile of 
funds and the database excluding the top decile and quintile of funds.  A summary of the funds by vintage year is also provided to allow insights into the performance of the 
funds over time. 
 Average Median St. Dev. 
 
Skewness 
25
th
 
Percentile 
75
th
 
Percentile Max. Min. 
Fund Multiple         
- Terminated  and Effectively Terminated Funds 4.38 2.66 7.72 8.79 1.62 4.99 96.1 0.18 
- Top decile 18.17 14.82 18.86 3.86 9.27 17.26 96.1 7.55 
- Excluding top decile 2.8 2.34 1.78 0.79 1.5 3.84 7.28 0.18 
- Excluding top quintile 2.34 2.01 1.3 0.55 1.34 3.23 5.49 0.18 
     - 1980 – 1984 2.33 1.83 1.56 2.04 1.43 2.57 7.28 0.59 
     - 1985 – 1989 3.07 2.66 1.68 0.69 1.89 3.98 7.6 0.57 
     - 1990 – 1994 5.07 2.99 6.13 3.07 1.86 5.81 32.45 0.53 
     - 1995 – 2006 6.18 3.12 12.25 6.22 1.1 6.49 96.1 0.18 
IRR          
- Terminated and Effectively Terminated Funds 47% 24% 72% 2.74 9% 61% 515% -94% 
- Top decile 215% 193% 92% 1.97 155% 254% 515% 133% 
- Excluding top decile 27% 20% 35% 0.69 7% 41% 125% -94% 
- Excluding top quintile 18% 16% 24% -0.46 6% 31% 76% -94% 
     - 1980 – 1984 17% 9% 23% 2.1 4% 20% 92% -5% 
     - 1985 – 1989 23% 19% 26% 2.06 11% 32% 155% -57% 
     - 1990 – 1994 42% 37% 40% -0.37 17% 64% 125% -94% 
     - 1995 - 2006 86% 55% 107% 1.48 4% 136% 515% -34% 
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Table VI 
Venture Fund Performance Relative to the Public Equity Market 
Fund Multiple and IRR measures of performance are estimated for a hypothetical set of funds that are created assuming that each terminated fund in the database made an 
equivalent investment in either  the S&P500 or the NASDAQ.  The Public Market Equivalent (PME) is a measure of the total disbursements to a fund expressed relative to 
the total distributions to the hypothetical fund.  This data is also summarised excluding the top decile and quintile of funds. 
 Average Median St. Dev. 
 
Skewness 
25
th
 
Percentile 
75
th
 
Percentile Max. Min. 
S&P500 Multiple  2.00 2.06 0.53 -0.05 1.75 2.29 3.85 0.73 
     - Excluding top decile 1.90 1.98 0.44 -0.87 1.71 2.21 2.52 0.73 
     - Excluding top quintile 1.82 1.91 0.41 -0.96 1.65 2.14 2.33 0.73 
S&P500 IRR  12% 12% 6% -1.28 11% 14% 27% -17% 
     - Excluding top decile 11% 12% 5% -2.50 11% 13% 19% -17% 
     - Excluding top quintile 10% 12% 5% -3.00 10% 13% 15% -17% 
S&P500 PME 1.98 1.21 5.07 10.43 0.68 1.88 58.44 0.20 
- Excluding top decile 1.23 1.02 0.74 0.89 0.64 1.64 3.11 0.20 
- Excluding top quintile 1.03 0.92 0.52 0.43 0.57 1.41 2.25 0.20 
Nasdaq Multiple  2.42 2.38 0.83 0.39 1.96 2.82 5.05 0.63 
     - Excluding top decile 2.23 2.27 0.63 -0.69 1.92 2.71 3.27 0.63 
     - Excluding top quintile 2.12 2.21 0.58 -0.90 1.86 2.58 2.92 0.63 
Nasdaq IRR 16% 15% 10% -0.24 11% 21% 45% -24% 
     - Excluding top decile 14% 14% 8% -1.50 11% 19% 28% -24% 
     - Excluding top quintile 13% 13% 7% -2.02  11% 17% 23% -24% 
Nasdaq PME  1.59 1.00 3.67 10.33 0.57 1.68 42.36 0.14 
     - Excluding top decile 1.02 0.93 0.57 0.66 0.57 1.33 2.48 0.14 
     - Excluding top quintile 0.88 0.83 0.43 0.44 0.54 1.19 1.85 0.14 
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Table VII 
Venture Fund Performance Relative to the Industry (1989 – 2006) 
Fund Multiple and IRR measures of performance are estimated for a hypothetical set of funds that are created assuming that each fund in the database with a vintage year of 
1989 or later, made an equivalent investment in the Sandhill venture industry benchmark index.  A summary of the multiple and IRR measures of performance for venture 
funds in the database is also presented over the restricted sample period.  The Public Market Equivalent (PME) is a measure of the total disbursements to a fund expressed 
relative to the total distributions to the hypothetical fund.   
 Average Median St. Dev. 
 
Skewness 
25
th
 
Percentile 
75
th
 
Percentile Max. Min. 
Fund Multiple 4.82 2.68 12.37 8.34 1.12 5.11 96.10 0.18 
Fund Multiple (Sandhill) 4.26 4.26 2.56 0.46 2.27 6.29 11.51 0.62 
IRR 34% 25% 60% 1.97 6% 46% 256% -94% 
IRR (Sandhill) 33% 35% 20% -0.72 27% 49% 70% -25% 
PME (Sandhill) 1.24 0.67 2.85 6.99 0.38 1.17 22.23 0.11 
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Table VIII 
Average Fund Multiple by Vintage Year Compared to the Industry 
The following table summarises the average multiple by vintage year across all terminated and active 
funds in the database.  This may be compared to an industry benchmark that is proxied by the average 
fund multiple for all funds in the Venture Economics database grouped by vintage year.    
Year 
Average Fund 
Multiple 
Average VE 
Multiple 
No. of Funds in 
VE Database 
1980 4.53 2.40 18 
1981 1.40 1.88 22 
1982 1.61 1.39 28 
1983 1.68 1.75 59 
1984 2.12 1.43 66 
1985 2.26 1.95 46 
1986 3.25 2.53 43 
1987 3.24 2.34 63 
1988 2.68 2.52 44 
1989 3.59 2.32 54 
1990 4.95 2.79 22 
1991 2.63 2.74 18 
1992 2.86 2.71 26 
1993 4.84 3.65 40 
1994 8.91 3.37 40 
1995 11.21 3.68 49 
1996 12.73 4.15 35 
1997 4.50 2.15 60 
1998 3.65 1.26 77 
1999 0.77 0.36 110 
2000 0.45 0.29 119 
2001 0.29 0.26 54 
2002 0.25 0.15 18 
2003 0.43 0.06 14 
2004 0.05 0.09 20 
2005 0.04 0.03 9 
2006 0.01 0.00 9 
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Table IX 
Fund Performance Persistence 
The following table summarises the output from a regression equation that measures fund performance 
persistence.  The current fund performance is regressed against the performance of the previous GPs 
fund(s). 
Dependent Variable IRRi IRRi  Multiplei Multiplei 
IRRi-1 0.6313 0.4088 Multiplei-1 0.5269 0.4771 
 (6.01) (2.17)  (6.77) (5.61) 
IRRi-2  -0.1330 Multiplei-2  -0.0923 
  (0.34)   (1.04) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.2438 0.1065 Adjusted R
2
 0.2464 0.1568 
No. of Obs. 110 61 No. of Obs. 110 61 
Note: absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
        : all standard errors are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
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Table X 
Venture Fund Performance (IRR) Relative to the State of the Market 
This table summarises the fund market conditions indicator which measures the state of the IPO market at the time the fund invested and redeemed those 
investments.  The fund exit conditions indicator focuses solely on measuring the IPO market conditions at the time the fund distributions are made.  The 
performance of the funds, as measured by the IRR, is summarised by market and exit conditions indicators in Panel B.  The same set of summary metrics are 
presented in Panel C, where the top decile of funds of funds are excluded.   
 
Average Median St. Dev. 
25
th
 
Percentile 
75
th
  
Percentile Max Min 
Investment Conditions Summary        
Entry Conditions 2.19 2.20 0.70 1.60 2.70 3.94 1.00 
Exit Conditions 2.52 2.60 0.67 2.14 2.98 3.94 1.00 
Market Conditions 0.33 0.42 0.90 -0.00 0.91 2.36 -2.59 
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Table XI 
Venture Fund Performance (IRR) Relative to the IPO Market 
The performance of the sample of venture funds, as measured by the IRR, is summarised by market and exit conditions indicators in Panel A.  The same set of 
summary metrics are presented in Panel B, where the top decile of funds of funds are excluded. 
 
Average Median St. Dev. 
 
Skewness 
25
th
 
Percentile 
75
th
  
Percentile Max Min 
Panel A: IRR Summary by Market and Exit Conditions 
- Market Conditions < -1 22% 4% 52% 1.28 -15% 39% 141% -30% 
- Market Conditions = -1 to 1 51% 27% 77% 2.75 9% 65% 515% -94% 
- Market Conditions > 1 41% 20% 60% 2.52 10% 32% 256% -10% 
- Exit Conditions <2 19% 9% 42% 1.60 -7% 29% 155% -34% 
- Exit Conditions = 2 to 3 33% 24% 42% 1.93 11% 40% 237% -94% 
- Exit Conditions >3 106% 76% 110% 1.56 22% 167% 515% -6% 
Panel B:  IRR Summary by Market and Exit Conditions (excluding  top decile) 
- Market Conditions < -1 9% -2% 37% 1.69 -16% 29% 116% -30% 
- Market Conditions = -1 to 1 31% 24% 36% 0.60 8% 44% 133% -94% 
- Market Conditions > 1 23% 18% 25% 1.62 9% 27% 94% -10% 
- Exit Conditions <2 6% 7% 23% 0.86 -9% 15% 83% -34% 
- Exit Conditions = 2 to 3 22% 20% 23% -1.20 10% 33% 71% -94% 
- Exit Conditions >3 78% 69% 70% 0.64 18% 130% 254% -6% 
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Table XII 
The Bubble and Venture Fund Performance: 1998 – 2002 
The following table summarises the performance of funds that were active during the bubble and post bubble periods.  To be considered active during the bubble 
period, a fund had to have made more than 50% of its distributions during the 1999Q2 – 2000Q3 period.  To be considered active during the post-bubble period, 
a fund had to have made more than 50% of its distributions after 2000Q4.   
  Bubble Funds   Post-Bubble Funds  
 Full Sample Excluding Top Decile Full Sample Excluding Top Decile 
 IRR Multiple IRR Multiple IRR Multiple IRR Multiple 
Average 111% 7.94 85% 5.05 8% 2.37 -3% 1.21 
Median 91% 4.66 78% 4.14 -3% 0.89 -7% 0.85 
Stdev 100% 13.15 61% 3.73 38% 3.83 20% 1.18 
Skewness 1.68 5.71 0.51 1.41 1.82 2.78 0.79 1.15 
25
th
 Percentile 39% 2.73 33% 2.12 -15% 0.64 -16% 0.58 
75
th
 Percentile 146% 7.73 131% 6.47 11% 1.70 7% 1.33 
Max 515% 96.10 237% 16.69 116% 14.85 42% 6.13 
Min -2% 0.97 -2% 0.97 -34% 0.18 -34% 0.18 
No. Obs. 56 56 50 50 28 28 25 25 
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Table XIII 
Investment Intensity by Vintage Year of Fund 
Table XIII presents a measure of the investment intensity of the fund database as well as the equivalent 
metric for all the funds in the VE database. 
Year 
 
Number  
of   
Funds 
Fund 
Investment 
Intensity 
VE Fund 
Investment 
Intensity 
1980 6 56% 16% 
1981 5 40% 21% 
1982 5 52% 27% 
1983 6 58% 28% 
1984 7 40% 29% 
1985 9 36% 28% 
1986 15 39% 32% 
1987 16 42% 34% 
1988 13 30% 30% 
1989 14 26% 24% 
1990 4 27% 25% 
1991 5 36% 26% 
1992 11 36% 33% 
1993 7 45% 31% 
1994 12 29% 22% 
1995 15 35% 27% 
1996 10 29% 32% 
1997 12 30% 30% 
1998 15 39% 28% 
1999 9 64% 38% 
2000 7 71% 42% 
2001 0 58% 26% 
2002 2 42% 27% 
Note: n/a – insufficient data 
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Figure I 
LP Investment Activity Compared to the Industry – Number of Funds 
The figure presents a plot of  the total number of funds in the database by year compared to the total 
number of new VC funds being raised by year as reported in the Venture Economics database. 
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Figure II 
LP Investment Activity Compared to the Industry – Fund Commitment 
The figure presents a plot of  the average commitment to each fund in the database by year compared to 
the average size of each new VC fund being raised by year as reported in the Venture Economics 
database. 
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Figure III 
Venture Fund IRR and Equivalent S&P500 Based IRR 
The estimated IRR of each terminated venture fund is plotted against the estimated IRR where an 
equivalent investment is made in the S&P500.  The solid line shows the equivalence between the two 
IRRs, such that where a fund generates an IRR that is superior (inferior) to an equivalent investment in 
the public equity market, its plot will fall above (below) the solid line.   
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Figure IV 
Quarterly IPO Market Data 
The total number of IPOs, total number of venture backed IPOs and total number of venture backed 
IPOs that were unprofitable at the time of investment are plotted in the upper panel.  The lower panel 
presents a plot of  the percentage of venture backed IPOs that were unprofitable. 
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Figure V 
Venture Fund IRR and Market Conditions 
The following table presents a plot of the fund IRR relative to the market conditions parameter for each 
fund.  The symbols are used to denote different vintage periods.   
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Figure VI 
Venture Fund IRR and Investment Exit Conditions 
The following table presents a plot of the venture fund IRR relative to the fund exit conditions.  The 
symbols are used to denote different vintage periods.   
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Figure VII 
  Intensity of Fund Takedown 
This figure presents a plot of the intensity of the takedown process for each year in the sample period 
for the funds captured in the database.  To provide a comparison to the industry, a similar metric is 
constructed for all funds captured in the Venture Economics database. 
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Appendix 
Summary of IPO Data 
The following table presents information as to the total number of IPOs, the total number of venture 
backed IPOs and the total number of venture backed IPOs that were unprofitable by quarter. 
Quarter 
Total 
IPOs 
VC-Backed 
IPOs 
Unprofitable 
VC-backed IPOS Quarter Total IPOs 
VC-Backed 
IPOs 
Unprofitable 
VC-backed IPOS 
1980Q1 13 6  1990Q1 64 15 1 
1980Q2 22 5  1990Q2 86 15 4 
1980Q3 47 13  1990Q3 66 19 2 
1980Q4 62 13  1990Q4 28 4 3 
1981Q1 63 18  1991Q1 39 14 4 
1981Q2 131 31  1991Q2 108 50 19 
1981Q3 73 15 1 1991Q3 99 37 12 
1981Q4 68 23 2 1991Q4 160 41 14 
1982Q1 24 6  1992Q1 196 65 29 
1982Q2 25 8  1992Q2 183 56 14 
1982Q3 18 6 1 1992Q3 112 26 7 
1982Q4 52 15 1 1992Q4 154 37 10 
1983Q1 81 27 2 1993Q1 166 62 17 
1983Q2 133 31 6 1993Q2 178 33 11 
1983Q3 216 58 10 1993Q3 198 56 20 
1983Q4 253 54 8 1993Q4 276 66 23 
1984Q1 143 25 5 1994Q1 211 44 11 
1984Q2 100 22 7 1994Q2 223 51 16 
1984Q3 96 16 1 1994Q3 139 24 12 
1984Q4 92 15 1 1994Q4 129 34 13 
1985Q1 62 7 1 1995Q1 85 20 3 
1985Q2 87 10 1 1995Q2 120 49 14 
1985Q3 96 14 1 1995Q3 139 44 16 
1985Q4 139 30 1 1995Q4 216 83 28 
1986Q1 109 16 1 1996Q1 158 62 29 
1986Q2 204 39 15 1996Q2 255 90 49 
1986Q3 247 36 13 1996Q3 197 52 21 
1986Q4 228 40 8 1996Q4 243 74 27 
1987Q1 136 18 6 1997Q1 146 33 17 
1987Q2 185 38 10 1997Q2 139 30 17 
1987Q3 202 39 9 1997Q3 149 38 19 
1987Q4 60 7 2 1997Q4 206 38 24 
1988Q1 56 7 0 1998Q1 123 21 12 
1988Q2 80 13 1 1998Q2 209 30 15 
1988Q3 75 14 4 1998Q3 123 19 12 
1988Q4 76 11 5 1998Q4 48 9 6 
1989Q1 41 6 1 1999Q1 96 27 18 
1989Q2 50 11 2 1999Q2 166 70 53 
1989Q3 53 14 6 1999Q3 178 84 64 
1989Q4 80 17 7 1999Q4 168 89 66 
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Appendix (Continued) 
 
Quarter Total IPOs 
VC-Backed 
IPOs 
Unprofitable 
VC-backed IPOS 
2000Q1 243 81 62 
2000Q2 162 53 38 
2000Q3 174 79 63 
2000Q4 84 24 20 
2001Q1 46 9 7 
2001Q2 40 9 7 
2001Q3 31 5 4 
2001Q4 45 14 7 
2002Q1 37 4 2 
2002Q2 66 15 9 
2002Q3 33 2 1 
2002Q4 52 4 2 
2003Q1 10 1 - 
2003Q2 24 2 1 
2003Q3 44 8 2 
2003Q4 57 16 12 
2004Q1 75 26 12 
2004Q2 107 26 18 
2004Q3 78 23 15 
2004Q4 79 25 16 
2005Q1 57 8 6 
2005Q2 78 7 5 
2005Q3 100 16 10 
2005Q4 61 12 6 
2006Q1 69 12 9 
2006Q2 88 19 8 
2006Q3 87 7 1 
2006Q4 82 20 4 
 
 
 
